United States of America v. Conley, et al. by unknown
1994 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
9-30-1994 
United States of America v. Conley, et al. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1994 
Recommended Citation 
"United States of America v. Conley, et al." (1994). 1994 Decisions. 150. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1994/150 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 




 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
  
 No. 93-3504 
 ___________ 
 
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
    Appellant 
 
   vs. 
 
 JOHN F. "Duffy" CONLEY; WILLIAM C. CURTIN; SHEILA 
SMITH; JOHN FRANCIS "Jack" CONLEY; THOMAS "Bud" 
MCGRATH; MARK A. ABBOTT; THOMAS ROSSI; WILLIAM 
STEINHART; ROBERTA FLEAGLE; ROBIN SPRATT; MONICA C. 
KAIL; WILLIAM J. REED; JOANNE T. SMITH; KENNETH "Ron" 
GOODWIN; LAWRENCE N. "Neudy" DEMINO, SR.; CHRISTOPHER 
"Chris" KAIL; JOSEPH A. DEVITA; FRANK GAROFALO; 
THOMAS D. CIOCCO; MICHAEL SUKALY; PHILLIP M. "Mike" 
FERRELL; ANESTOS "Naz" RODITES; WILLIAM E. RUSIN 
 ___________ 
  
 Appeal from the United States District Court  
 for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Crim. No. 91-cr-00178) 
 ___________ 
   
 Argued 
 April 26, 1994 
 Before:  MANSMANN, HUTCHINSON and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
 (Filed September 30, 1994) 
 ___________ 
 
Paul J. Brysh, Esquire (ARGUED) 
Linda L. Kelly, Esquire 
Office of the United States Attorney 
633 United States Post Office 
  & Courthouse 
Pittsburgh, PA  15219 
 
  COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT 
 
Anthony M. Mariani, Esquire 
36th Floor Grant Building 
Pittsburgh, PA  15219 
 






Ellen M. Viakley, Esquire 
436 Seventh Avenue 
1550 Koppers Building 
Pittsburgh, PA  15219 
 
  COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE SMITH 
 
Alisa N. Carr, Esquire 
Laughlin, Difenderfer & Boyle 
140 Fort Pitt Commons Building 
Pittsburgh, PA  15219 
 
  COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE JOHN F. CONLEY 
 
Caroline M. Roberto, Esquire (ARGUED) 
5th Floor, Law & Finance Building 
Pittsburgh, PA  15219 
 
  COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE MCGRATH 
 
Lee Markovitz, Esquire 
1040 Fifth Avenue 
Pittsburgh, PA  15219 
 
  COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE SMITH 
 
Foster A. Stewart, Esquire 
Stewart & Associates 
1550 Koppers Building 
Pittsburgh, PA  15219 
 
  COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE KAIL 
 
John P. Goodrich, Esquire 
Goodrich, Micale & Search 
436 Boulevard of the Allies 
Pittsburgh, PA  15219 
 
  COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE SUKALY 
 
Gary B. Zimmerman, Esquire 
312 Boulevard of the Allies 
Suite 620 
Pittsburgh, PA  15222 
 
  COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE FERRELL 
 
Vincent R. Baginski, Esquire 
430 Boulevard of the Allies 




  COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE RODITES 
 
Peter V. Marcoline, Jr., Esquire 
1414 Grant Building 
Pittsburgh, PA  15219 
 
  COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE RUSIN 
 
Carl M. Janavitz, Esquire 
519 Allegheny Building 
Pittsburgh, PA  15219 
 
  COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE GAROFALO 
 
Gary Gerson, Esquire 
220 Grant Street 
Pittsburgh, PA  15219 
 
  COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE JOHN FRANCIS CONLEY 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 __________ 
 
MANSMANN,  Circuit Judge. 
 The United States Government appeals a pre-trial order 
of the district court dismissing, with prejudice, the money 
laundering object of a criminal conspiracy count against Thomas 
"Bud" McGrath and thirteen other defendants who joined his motion 
to dismiss.  This complicated case originally involved a total of 
twenty-nine counts against twenty-three defendants who were 
alleged to have conducted an illegal gambling business.  The 
general question before us is whether the district court erred as 
a matter of law when it dismissed the money laundering object of 
the conspiracy alleged in Count One of the indictment due to the 
district court's perception that double jeopardy concerns are 
 
 
implicated when both a conspiracy to commit money laundering and 
the substantive offense of illegal gambling are alleged. 
 We must decide whether Title 18, United States Code 
Section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) proscribes money laundering transactions 
with the proceeds of an illegal gambling business, in the absence 
of some other form of specified unlawful activity.  Because we 
find that money laundering with the proceeds of an illegal 
gambling business is one of the types of specified unlawful 
activity the money laundering statute proscribes and because we 
find that Congress did intend to impose a further punishment 
under § 1956 for using the proceeds of an illegal gambling 
business to promote that illegal activity, we will vacate the 
district court's order dismissing the money laundering object of 
the conspiracy charged in Count One of the indictment and remand 
this case to the district court for reinstatement of this portion 
of Count One.   
 
 I. 
 On September 26, 1991, a grand jury sitting in 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, returned a twenty-nine count indictment 
charging twenty-three individuals with participation in an 
illegal gambling business involving video poker machines.1  The 
                     
1.   The twenty-three persons named in the indictment are:  
John F. "Duffy" Conley, William C. Curtin, Sheila F. Smith, John 
Francis "Jack" Conley, Thomas "Bud" McGrath, Mark A. Abbott, 
Thomas Rossi, William Steinhart, Roberta Fleagle, Robin Spratt, 
Monica C. Kail, William J. Reed, Joanne T. Smith, Kenneth "Ron" 
Goodwin, Lawrence N. "Neudy" Demino, Sr., Christopher "Chris" 
Kail, Joseph A. Devita, Frank Garofalo, Thomas D. Ciocco, Michael 
Sukaly, Phillip M. "Mike" Ferrell, Anestos "Naz" Rodites, and 
 
 
indictment identified John F. "Duffy" Conley as the central 
figure in the extensive illegal gambling operation, alleging that 
Duffy Conley was the owner and operator of Duffy's Vending and/or 
Three Rivers Coin, which had the primary purpose of facilitating 
an illegal gambling business through video poker machines.   
 The indictment also identified the remaining defendants 
and their roles.  William L. Curtin was the general manager of 
Duffy's Vending, assisting Duffy Conley in daily operations.  
Sheila Smith was an office manager, accountant and bookkeeper for 
Duffy Conley, also supervising employees who placed, moved and 
serviced video poker machines.  Jack Conley recorded service 
calls from locations and facilitated the movement, repair and 
servicing of video poker machines.  Thomas Bud McGrath, Duffy 
Conley's employee, marketed and secured locations for Duffy 
Conley's video poker machines.  Mark Abbott, another employee of 
Duffy Conley, also marketed, moved and secured locations for 
Duffy Conley's video poker machines.2 
(..continued) 
William E. Rusin.  Three of the defendants -- William Steinhart, 
Monica Kail and William Reed -- have pleaded guilty. 
 
2.   The indictment alleged that certain defendants assisted 
Duffy Conley by facilitating the placement and use of illegal 
gambling devices at various locations under their control as 
follows:  Thomas Rossi (Carnegie American Legion), William 
Steinhart (Carnegie American Legion), Robert Fleagle (Terry's 
Snack Shop), Robin Spratt (Terry's Snack Shop), Monica Kail 
(Kail's Coffee Corner), William Reed (Idlewood Inn), Joanne Smith 
(The Coffee Pot), Kenneth "Ron" Goodwin (The Coffee Shop and 
Bloomfield Snack Shop), Lawrence "Neudy" Demino, Sr. (The Sunny 
Farms Deli), and William Rusin (Mugshots and Cruisin II). 
 
 The indictment further alleged that Duffy Conley 
employed Chris Kail, Joseph Devita, Frank Garofalo, Thomas 
 
 
 The indictment originally charged twenty-nine counts 
against various combinations of these defendants.  We set forth 
in detail the charges and overt acts alleged in Counts One and 
Two of the indictment because the sufficiency of these counts to 
charge certain offenses is at issue here. 
 Count One charged all twenty-three defendants with 
conspiracy to conduct an illegal gambling business, in violation 
of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1955, and conspiracy to 
engage in money laundering to promote the unlawful gambling 
business in violation of Title 18 United States Code, Section 
1956.3  Specifically, Count One charged that "[i]t was an 
(..continued) 
Ciocco, Michael Sukaly, Phillip "Mike" Ferrell, Anestos "Naz" 
Rodites and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury as 
"collectors" whose duties included visiting machine locations and 
collecting the proceeds of video poker machine gambling.  The 
indictment also alleged that William Rusin was an "associate" of 
Duffy Conley, who entrusted Rusin with depositing proceeds of the 
illegal gambling business into a Pittsburgh National Bank 
account, the Duffy's Vending Account.  For more detail, see the 
opinion of the district court, United States v. Conley, 833 F. 
Supp. 1121 (W.D. Pa. 1993). 
3.   The substantive illegal gambling statute provides, in 
pertinent part: 
 
 (a)  Whoever conducts, finances, manages, 
supervises, directs, or owns all or part of 
an illegal gambling business shall be fined 
not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more 
than five years, or both. 
 (b)  As used in this section-- 
  (1) "illegal gambling business" means a 
gambling business which-- 
      (i) is a violation of the law of a 
State or political subdivision in which it is 
conducted; 
      (ii) involves five or more persons 
who conduct, finance, manage, supervise, 
 
 
essential part of the illegal gambling business run by John F. 
`Duffy' Conley that the proceeds of this unlawful activity be 
collected from the various locations where the video poker 
machines were in use as illegal gambling devices." (¶18; App. 
57).  Count One also charged that the collection of such proceeds 
involved the division of money with persons at the video poker 
machine locations, the delivery of proceeds to other employees of 
Conley, and the depositing of money into bank accounts controlled 
by Conley.  (¶ 18, App. 57.)  The acts of collecting, dividing, 
transferring, and depositing the proceeds are all transactions as 
(..continued) 
direct, or own all or part of such business; 
and 
      (iii) has been or remains in 
substantially continuous operation for a 
period in excess of thirty days or has a 
gross revenue of $2,000 in any single day. 
 
Prohibition of illegal gambling businesses, 18 U.S.C. § 1955 
(1988). 
 
 The substantive money laundering statute provides, in 
pertinent part: 
 
 Whoever, knowing that the property involved 
in a financial transaction represents the 
proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, 
conducts or attempts to conduct such a 
financial transaction which in fact involves 
the proceeds of specified unlawful activity-- 
  (A)(i) with the intent to promote the 
carrying on of specified unlawful activity 
. . . shall be sentenced to a fine of not 
more than $500,000 or twice the value of the 
property involved in the transaction, 
whichever is greater, or imprisonment for not 
more than twenty years, or both. 
 
Laundering of monetary instruments, 18 U.S.C.A. § 
1956(a)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. 1993). 
 
 
defined in Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956(c)(3) 
("Laundering of Monetary Instruments"). 
 Count One further charged that Conley conducted 
financial transactions affecting interstate commerce with the 
proceeds of illegal gambling with video poker machines "with the 
intent to promote the carrying on of the specified unlawful 
activity, illegal gambling with video poker machines. . . ." 
(¶21(b); App. 59-60).  In addition, it stated that Conley used 
illegal gambling proceeds to purchase more video poker machines 
and to pay employees of Duffy's Vending/Three Rivers Coin (¶29, 
31; App. 65).  The overt acts of the conspiracy to launder money 
included numerous payments to Matrix, an entity used to service 
the video poker machines.  (Indictment ¶33; App. 66.) 
 Count Two charged the substantive offense of conducting 
an illegal gambling business in violation of Title 18, United 
States Code, Section 1955.  Count Two alleged that "on or around 
June of 1984 and continuing to on or around September 1991 . . . 
defendants . . . did unlawfully and knowingly conduct, finance, 
manage, supervise, direct and own all or part of an illegal 
gambling business involving video poker machines. . . ."  This 
illegal gambling business "involved five or more persons who 
conducted, financed, managed, supervised, directed and owned all 
or part of the business, remained in substantially continuous 
operation for a period in excess of thirty (30) days and had a 
gross revenue of more than $2,000 for a single day."4 
                     
4.   Counts three to five, seven to ten and twelve charged 
interstate travel to promote an illegal gambling business, in 
 
 
 On May 18, 1992, McGrath filed a motion to dismiss the 
money laundering object of the conspiracy count, joined by 
thirteen other defendants.5  McGrath advanced four legal 
arguments in support of his motion.  First, McGrath asserted that 
the government had failed to establish that he satisfied the 
essential elements of the substantive money laundering statute.  
Next, he asserted that the government had placed him in double 
jeopardy by charging him with both conspiracy to launder money 
and the substantive offense of conducting an illegal gambling 
operation.  McGrath's third assertion was that the substantive 
money laundering statute was unconstitutionally vague as it 
applied to him.  Finally, McGrath maintained that the substantive 
money laundering statute was overbroad.6   
(..continued) 
violation of Title 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (a)(3).  Counts six and 
eleven charged interstate transportation of gambling devices, in 
violation of Title 18 U.S.C. §§ 1172 and 1176.  Counts thirteen 
to twenty-nine charged thirteen of the defendants with 
substantive money laundering offenses in violation of Title 18 
U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i).  On July 17, 1993, upon motion of 
these defendants, the district court issued an opinion and order 
dismissing most of the substantive money laundering counts 
(Counts 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28 and 29) on 
duplicity grounds.  The government has not appealed that order. 
  
5.   They are Duffy Conley, Sheila Smith, Jack Conley, Mark 
Abbott, Joanne Smith, Ken Goodwin, Laurence Demino, Thomas 
Ciocco, Michael Sukaly, Phillip Ferrell, Anestos Rodites and 
William Rusin.  On September 3, 1993, the district court granted 
their motions to join in McGrath's motion.  
6.   We note that although all four of these issues were 
raised before the district court, the district court's opinion 
focused on addressed McGrath's double jeopardy argument.  Because 
the district court granted McGrath's motion on the basis of this 
argument, the court decided that McGrath's remaining contentions 
were mooted by its Memorandum Opinion.  United States v. Conley, 
833 F. Supp. at 1158, n.33.   
 
 
 On June 19, 1992, the government responded to these 
arguments, observing that, "Virtually all of McGrath's challenges 
to Count One of the Indictment . . . fail for a very simple 
reason.  McGrath has not addressed or applied the directives of 
the law governing a conspiracy charge."  The government further 
observed, "McGrath is charged with conspiracy, not money 
laundering . . . .  McGrath instead proceeds from the false 
assumption that the government must marshall the evidence to 
demonstrate that he is guilty of a substantive money laundering 
violation." (App. at 156).7 
 On September 3, 1993, the district court granted 
McGrath's motion to dismiss and ordered that the money laundering 
object of the conspiracy alleged in Count One of the indictment 
at ¶21(b) be stricken with prejudice.  The district court's forty 
page opinion focused on McGrath's double jeopardy argument, 
identifying two separate aspects of this argument.  Paraphrasing 
the motion, the district court stated, "First, [McGrath] contends 
that the conspiracy to launder money is the same offense as the 
substantive illegal gambling charge."  The district court 
(..continued) 
 
 Accordingly, we need not reach any of these issues on 
appeal, as none of these other issues has been raised by the 
appellees as alternative grounds in support of the district 
court's decision. 
7.   McGrath acknowledges that he has not been charged with 
a substantive violation of the money laundering statute; he 
argues that he was entitled to dismissal of Count One because "he 
had not been charged with any substantive money laundering 
offenses, nor had he been charged with any overt money laundering 




correctly  rejected this double jeopardy argument, concluding 
that, "Conspiracy to launder money and conducting an illegal 
gambling operation were not the same offense for purposes of 
double jeopardy."  United States v. Conley, 833 F. Supp. at 1130.  
The district court, however, was troubled by McGrath's "implicit" 
argument that "an illegal gambling business is a lesser included 
offense of laundering the `proceeds' of an illegal gambling 
business, despite [McGrath's] being charged with substantive 
illegal gambling, but not money laundering."  Id.  The district 
court opined, "If violation of the illegal gambling prohibition 
is a lesser included offense of money laundering and Congress's 
intent to impose multiple punishments is not clear, the propriety 
of alleging a `lesser included object' as a separate object must 
be addressed."  The district court surmised that "If Congress 
intended the facts alleged to be covered by both statutes, with 
multiple punishments, a conspiracy alleging both objects is 
properly charged."  Id.   
 After engaging in an extensive analysis of legislative 
history, the district court concluded that congressional intent 
to impose multiple punishments was not clear.  As a consequence, 
the court applied the rule of lenity, holding that double 
jeopardy constraints prevented a defendant from being charged 
with both substantive illegal gambling offenses and substantive 
money laundering offenses.  The district court then observed the 
impossibility of being indicted for conspiring to do something 
legal:  "That Count One, the conspiracy count, does not charge 
Defendants with substantive money laundering cannot save the 
 
 
money laundering object of the conspiracy count.  An agreement to 
engage in conduct that is not illegal under Section 1956 can no 
more be the basis of a conspiracy conviction than the conduct 
itself can be the basis of a substantive conviction."8  833 F. 
Supp. at 1158.  Based upon this observation, the district court 
concluded, "[T]he money laundering object of the conspiracy fails 
to state an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 18 U.S.C. § 1956 
(a)(1)(A)(i)."  Accordingly, the district court dismissed the 
money laundering object of the conspiracy contained in Count One. 
 The district court had subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 3231.  We have 
appellate jurisdiction of the dismissal of a portion of an 
indictment pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 
3731.  See Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 69 n.23 (1978) 
(holding "there is no statutory barrier to an appeal from an 
order dismissing only a portion of a count").  Our task is to 
determine, on plenary review,9 whether the district court 
                     
8.   The district court noted: 
 
 The crux of the money laundering object of the 
conspiracy count is that "during the period November 
1986 through September 1991 cash proceeds from illegal 
gambling involving video poker machines was received, 
transferred, delivered, deposited or otherwise 
transacted by the defendants in violation of Title 18, 
United States Code, Section 1956.  If this actually 
could not be properly charged as substantive money 
laundering, it cannot survive as a money laundering 
object of the conspiracy count. 
 
United States v. Conley, 833 F. Supp. at 1156. 
9.   Our review of the sufficiency of an indictment to 
charge an offense is a legal question subject to plenary review.  
 
 
committed legal error in concluding that the indictment is 
violative of the prohibition against double jeopardy.   
 
 II. 
 The Double Jeopardy clause provides that no person 
shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb."  U.S. Const., Amdt. 5.  This 
protection applies both to multiple punishments and successive 
prosecutions for the same criminal offense.10  In the contexts of 
both multiple punishments and successive prosecutions, the double 
jeopardy bar applies if the two offenses for which the defendant 
is punished or tried constitute the same offense.  Blockburger v. 
United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).   
 Criminal statutes need not be identical to be 
constitute the same offense for purposes of double jeopardy 
analysis.  Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 164 (1977).  In order to 
determine whether two offenses are the same offense sufficient to 
warrant protection against multiple punishments, we inquire 
whether "[e]ach of the offenses created requires proof of a 
different element."  Blockburger v. United States, supra.  More 
specifically, "[t]he applicable rule is that where the same act 
or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory 
(..continued) 
United States v. Leo, 941 F.2d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 1991); United 
States v. Olatunji, 872 F.2d 1161, 1163 (3d Cir. 1989).   
10.   The principles we describe are well settled and the 
district court appropriately applied them.  We state them here 
for the purpose of putting in context the second argument 
advanced by the defendants which the district court adopted. 
 
 
provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are 
two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires 
proof of a fact which the other does not."  Id.  In Garrett v. 
United States, 471 U.S. 773 (1985) the Supreme Court further 
refined the Blockburger test in a double jeopardy analysis.  
Under Garrett, "[t]he critical inquiry is whether the . . . 
[broader] offense is considered the `same offense' as one or more 
of the predicate offenses within the meaning of the double 
jeopardy clause."  471 U.S. at 786.  In pursuing this inquiry, 
the Court looked to the general meaning of the term "same" and to 
the allegations of the actual crimes charged and asked if they 
were the "same offense."  471 U.S. at 786.   
 As the Court held in Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 
684, 692 (1980), however, the Blockburger test is one of 
statutory construction:  it reflects the assumption that 
"Congress ordinarily does not intend to punish the same offense 
under two different statutes."  Id.  Because the rule "serves as 
a means of discerning congressional purpose [, it] should not be 
controlling where, for example, there is a clear indication of 
contrary legislative intent."  Albernaz v. United States, 450 
U.S. 333, 340 (1981).  Congress, under this circumstance, may 
impose cumulative punishments.  The double jeopardy clause's 
protection against multiple punishments in a single case ensures 
only that a court does not impose a punishment in excess of the 
punishment intended by the legislature.  See Missouri v. Hunter, 
459 U.S. 359, 368 (1983) ("[l]egislatures, not courts, prescribe 
the scope of punishments"). 
 
 
 Evidence which establishes a violation of more than one 
criminal statute does not necessarily indicate that those 
statutes proscribe the same offense.  United States v. Felix, 112 
S. Ct. 1377 (1992).  Instead, the test enunciated in Blockburger  
"focuses on the proof necessary to prove the statutory elements 
of each offense rather than on the actual evidence to be 
presented at trial."  Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 416 
(1980). 
 In Ianelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 (1975), 
the Court noted that "[t]raditionally the law has considered 
conspiracy and the completed substantive offense to be separate 
crimes."  Although the substantive offense forms a part of the 
conspiracy offense and therefore could be considered by some to 
be one of its "incidents," the Court held that "the conspiracy to 
commit an offense and the subsequent commission of that crime 
normally do not merge into a single punishable act."  Id.  Thus 
the conspiracy and substantive offenses would not be considered 
the same offense for double jeopardy purposes because 
"[c]onspiracy is an inchoate offense, the essence of which is an 
agreement to commit an unlawful act."  Id.  An agreement to 
commit a substantive offense presents distinct dangers beyond 
those associated with the commission of the offense itself: 
 Concerted action both increases the 
likelihood that the criminal object will be 
successfully attained and decreased the 
probability that the individual involved will 
depart from their path of criminality.  Group 
association for criminal purposes often, if 
not normally, makes possible the attainment 
of ends more complex than those which one 




Id. at 778.   
 In cases involving the interactions between other, more 
complex criminal statutes, similar reasoning effectively has 
dispelled double jeopardy concerns about the imposition of 
multiple punishments.  See Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773 
(1985) (continuing criminal enterprise (21 U.S.C. § 848) and 
predicate narcotics offenses (21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 843(b), 846, 952, 
960, 963));  Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 (1981) 
(conspiracy to import narcotics (21 U.S.C. § 963) and conspiracy 
to distribute narcotics (21 U.S.C. § 846)); United States v. 
Console, 13 F.3d 641 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 62 U.S.L.W. 
3722 (1994) (racketeering (18 U.S.C. § 1962) and predicate mail 
fraud offenses (18 U.S.C. § 1341)). 
 
 A. 
 McGrath maintained before the district court that he 
would be subjected to multiple punishments for these offenses: 
conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 371; and conducting an illegal gambling business, in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1955.  The starting point -- and the ending point 
as well -- are the essential elements of each of these statutes.  
 In order to prove conspiracy to commit money 
laundering, the government must establish the following three 
essential elements: (1) the conspiracy, agreement, or 
understanding to commit money laundering was formed, reached, or 
entered into by two or more persons; (2) at some time during the 
 
 
existence or life of the conspiracy, agreement, or understanding, 
one of its alleged members knowingly performed one of the overt 
acts charged in the indictment in order to further or advance the 
purpose of the agreement; and (3) at some time during the 
existence or life of the conspiracy, agreement, or understanding, 
the defendant knew the purpose of the agreement, and then 
deliberately joined the conspiracy, agreement or understanding.  
See United States v. Rankin, 870 F.2d 109, 113 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 493 U.S. 840 (1989). 
 To prove a violation of the illegal gambling statute, 
the government must establish these three elements:  (1) a 
gambling business described in the indictment was conducted which 
violated the laws of the state in which it was conducted; (2) 
five more persons including the defendant, knowingly and 
deliberately conducted, financed, managed, supervised, directed 
or owned all or part of that gambling business; and (3) the 
gambling business was either in substantially continuous 
operation for more than thirty days, or, alternatively, the 
gambling business, on at least one day, had gross revenues of two 
thousand dollars or more.  18 United States Code § 1955(a) and 
(b); Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 772 (1975). 
 Clearly, conviction of the conspiracy statute requires 
proof of an element which the gambling statute does not:  that 
the conspiracy, agreement, or understanding to commit money 
laundering was formed, reached, or entered into by two or more 
persons, not necessarily including the defendant.  Just as 
clearly, conviction of the gambling statute requires proof of an 
 
 
element which the conspiracy statute does not:  that five or more 
persons, including the defendant, knowingly and deliberately 
conducted, financed, managed, supervised, directed or owned all 
or a part of a gambling business.  The statutes, therefore, do 
not constitute the same offense for double jeopardy purposes.  
 Insofar as the district court found that a conspiracy 
to launder money and a substantive violation of the illegal 
gambling business prohibition were not the same under Blockburger 
and thus  concluded that Congress intended multiple punishments 
for a conspiracy to launder money and violation of the 
substantive illegal gambling prohibition, the district court was 
correct in so holding.  The district court's analysis, however, 
did not end here; it is this second portion of its analysis that 




 B.   
 McGrath next asserted before the district court that 
the money laundering object of the conspiracy is the "same 
offense" as the illegal gambling business object of the 
conspiracy under Blockburger.  The essence of McGrath's argument 
was that "the money laundering activity charged in this case is 
temporally and statutorily the same activity necessary to conduct 
an illegal video poker gambling business."  McGrath contends 
before us that a wide variety of transactions involving the money 
placed into the video poker machines is necessarily part of the 
illegal gambling business, including collecting and counting 
money, dividing up money, transferring and transporting money, 
depositing money into banks and withdrawing money from banks.  
McGrath contends that this same conduct cannot be properly 
alleged to be money laundering.  See 833 F. Supp. at 1156.   
 In analyzing the alleged "sameness" between the money 
laundering activity and the "specified unlawful activity," i.e., 
the illegal gambling activity, the district court found that 
conducting the illegal gambling business constituted a "species 
of lesser included offense" of money laundering if it is the 
elements of the illegal gambling business upon which the 
government seeks to rely to prove "specified unlawful activity."  
833 F. Supp. at 1133. 
 Apparently troubled by the superficial similarity 
between the substantive money laundering offense and the 
substantive illegal gambling offense, the district court 
addressed whether conducting "an illegal gambling business is a 
 
 
lesser included offense of laundering the `proceeds' of an 
illegal gambling business . . . ."  Id.  The district court 
reasoned that if the substantive illegal gambling statute is a 
lesser included offense of the substantive money laundering 
statute, double jeopardy principles may prohibit the government 
from charging conspiracy to commit money laundering and the 
substantive offense of conducting an illegal gambling business. 
 Because McGrath had not been charged with substantively 
laundering any "proceeds," the district court justified its 
consideration of these two statutes by reasoning that "[f]or an 
agreement to constitute a conspiracy . . . the object of the 
agreement or the means of effectuating it must be illegal."  833 
F. Supp. at 1156.  This statement is certainly true.  As we have 
observed, in order to convict a defendant of conspiracy, the 
government must "prove an agreement which contemplates the 
commission of a crime and that such crime is in fact and law a 
federal offense."  United States v. Pepe, 512 F.2d 1192, 1132 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 893 (1975).  In keeping with this, 
the district court should have ascertained whether the conduct 
alleged as the object of the conspiracy would, if completed, 
constitute a violation of the substantive money laundering 
statute.  Indeed here it does constitute such a violation.  See 
App. at 73-83 (overt acts in the indictment detailing activities 
proscribed by the substantive money laundering statute).  Because 
"the object of the agreement" was illegal, the district court 
should have concluded its inquiry.  Instead, the district court 
made reference to an entirely different statute, one proscribing 
 
 
the conduct of an illegal gambling business.  See 18 United 
States Code § 1955 (1988). 
 We are concerned with the district court's focus on 
whether the substantive offense of conducting an illegal gambling 
operation and the substantive offense of money laundering were 
the same for purposes of double jeopardy, because McGrath was 
never charged with the substantive offense of money laundering.  
Based upon its finding of a double jeopardy problem with the 
simultaneous application of these two statutes -- the substantive 
money laundering statute and the substantive illegal gambling 
statute -- the district court held,  
 Because the intent of Congress to impose a 
punishment under section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) for 
acts already penalized under the illegal 
gambling statute is not clear, and because 
defendant McGrath and the joining defendants 
are entitled to the benefit of the rule of 
lenity, the court holds that activities 
penalized under section 1955, the Prohibition 
of Illegal Gambling Businesses, are not 
without more, also punishable under Section 
1956(a)(1)(A)(i).  Section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) 
will continue to apply in the context of an 
illegal gambling business where the 
"promoted" "specified unlawful activity" is 
other than the underlying illegal gambling 
business, and section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) will 
continue to apply to the core of money 
laundering. 
 
833 F. Supp. at 1158 (citations omitted).  We disagree with the 
district court's conclusion that a substantive illegal gambling 
offense can never constitute the "specified unlawful activity" 
for purposes of the money laundering statute.  Its decision that 
a money laundering conviction under section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) may 
 
 
not be based on the income from an illegal gambling business, 
unless there exists some additional form of specified unlawful 
activity, is erroneous and is not supported by the statutory 
language or legislative history.   
 As written, the money laundering statute requires that 
money laundering transactions be conducted with the "proceeds" of 
specified unlawful activity and that such transactions be 
committed with the intent either to promote the specified 
unlawful activity or to conceal the nature or source of the 
income.  The money laundering activity and the illegal gambling 
activity, therefore, do not constitute the "same offense" within 
the meaning of Blockburger due to this "intent" requirement.11   
 The acts of conducting an illegal gambling business 
consist of placing, maintaining and servicing video poker 
machines in various locations.  An additional aspect of 
conducting an illegal gambling business necessarily includes the 
collecting of the proceeds of the illegal gambling activity.  The 
                     
11.   We have interpreted this "intent to promote" 
requirement broadly and have held that a defendant can engage in 
financial transactions that promote not only ongoing or future 
unlawful activity, but also prior unlawful activity.  United 
States v. Paramo, 998 F.2d 1212, 1215 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. 
denied, 62 U.S.L.W. 3551 (1994).  There, we held that Paramo had 
the intent to promote specified unlawful activity, mail fraud, by 
cashing embezzled IRS checks.  Although none of the proceeds 
obtained from the earlier mail frauds were actually used to 
facilitate the subsequent frauds, we recognized that it did not 
have to be a future mail fraud that was promoted, it could be a 
past mail fraud or an ongoing mail fraud.  Because cashing the 
checks was necessary to realize any benefit from the mail fraud, 
we held that it was permissible for the jury to infer Paramo 
cashed each stolen check with the intent to promote the carrying 
on of the antecedent fraud.   
 
 
district court touches upon the concern that the money laundering 
statute not be applied so broadly as to cover any and all 
dispositions of the proceeds of the specified unlawful activity.  
Obviously, whenever a defendant makes money from criminal 
activity he has to do something with it.  As the district court 
correctly observed, Congress did not enact money laundering 
statutes simply to add to the penalties for various crimes in 
which defendants make money.  833 F. Supp. at 1155-56. 
 However, in prosecutions under Sections 1956(a)(1), 
this concern is adequately addressed by applying the "promotion" 
and "concealment" branches of § 1956's "intent" requirement.  
Section 1956(a)(1), quite clearly, does not prohibit all 
financial transactions that are conducted with the proceeds of 
specified unlawful activity.  It only proscribes those 
transactions that are conducted with the intent to promote 
certain further illegal activity, under subsection (A), or that 
are designed to conceal under subsection (B). 
 These requirements would preclude the application of 
section 1956 to non-money laundering acts such as a defendant's 
depositing the proceeds of unlawful activity in a bank account in 
his own name and using the money for personal purposes.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832 (7th Cir. 1991).  In 
Jackson, the defendant was prosecuted for money laundering when 
he used the proceeds of drug transactions to purchase telephone 
paging beepers and car telephones.  He also used the drug 
proceeds to make rental payments.  The Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit held that the evidence showed that purchasing the 
 
 
beepers promoted further drug activity, but that purchasing the 
car phones and making rental payments did not. 
 Applying these principles here, we note that after the 
proceeds are collected, the treatment given to them may be such 
that it violates § 1956, as well as § 1955.  If the proceeds are 
treated in a manner so as to conceal that their source is illegal 
gambling, § 1956(a)(1)(B) has been violated.  If subsequent 
financial transactions are conducted with these proceeds with the 
intent to promote the illegal gambling activity, § 1956(a)(1)(A) 
has been violated.12  The element charged in the latter 
violation, which was not necessary for the offense of conducting 
an illegal gambling business is that of "promotion," i.e., the 
advancing or furthering of the illegal gambling business.   
 McGrath's assertion that the activity of dividing up, 
collecting, transferring and even depositing proceeds into a bank 
are essential facets of carrying on an illegal gambling business, 
and therefore, cannot, due to double jeopardy constraints, serve 
as the basis for a money laundering object of conspiracy must 
fail.  The acts McGrath identifies as constituting an "integral 
                     
 
12.   Count One charged (¶ 21b, app. 59-60) that the 
defendant (Conley) conducted financial transactions affecting 
interstate commerce with the proceeds of illegal gambling with 
video poker machines "with the intent to promote the carrying on 
of specified unlawful activity, illegal gambling with video poker 
machines . . . ."  Specifically, Count One charged that Conley 
used illegal gambling proceeds to purchase more video poker 
machines (¶ 29, app. 65) and to pay employees of Duffy's Vending.  
(¶ 31, app. 65).   The overt acts alleged included numerous 
payments to Matrix, an entity used to service the poker machines.  
These allegations are sufficient to charge a money laundering 
offense under the promotion branch of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1). 
 
 
part of the illegal gambling business" would likewise constitute 
an integral part of many other criminal enterprises, such as a 
narcotics business. 
 In arguing that the money laundering activity in this 
case was "temporally" the same activity necessary to conduct an 
illegal video poker gambling business, McGrath relies on two 
recent cases interpreting the Money Laundering Control Act which 
suggest that § 1957 would apply only to monetary transactions 
occurring after the completion of the underlying criminal 
activity.  In United States v. Edgmon, 952 F.2d 1206 (10th Cir. 
1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 3037 (1992) and United States v. 
Lovett, 964 F.2d 1029 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 169 
(1992), the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit confronted 
double jeopardy challenges to convictions under the Money 
Laundering Control Act.  In each of these cases, the Court of 
Appeals concluded that Congress intended to impose separate 
punishments for money laundering transactions and for the 
underlying criminal activity, and that it intended the money 
laundering statutes to apply to transactions occurring after the 
completion of the underlying criminal activity.  With respect to 
§ 1956, the court stated that, "Congress aimed the crime of money 
laundering at conduct that follows in time the underlying crime 
rather than to afford an alternative means of punishing the prior 
`specified unlawful activity."  Id. at 1214 (emphasis added).  In 
United States v. Lovett, supra, the court reached the same 
conclusion with respect to § 1957.  Later, in United States v. 
Johnson, 971 F.2d 562 (10th Cir. 1992), the Court of Appeals held 
 
 
that it was possible to construe the phrase "proceeds obtained 
from a criminal offense" more broadly than this.  The court held 
that "one might logically infer that Congress would have intended 
§ 1957 to apply when the underlying criminal activity occurs 
simultaneously with a monetary transaction with the proceeds of 
the activity."  971 F.2d at 569.   
      Our decision in this case is not inconsistent with 
these cases requiring that there be some distinction between the 
specified unlawful activity and the financial transaction.  Our 
decision today is consistent with our decision in United States 
v. Paramo, 998 F.2d 1212 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 62 
U.S.L.W. 3551 (1994), and with the statutory requirement that the 
financial transaction involve "proceeds" of unlawful activity.  
Although the money laundering statute does not define when money 
becomes "proceeds," it is obvious to us that proceeds are derived 
from an already completed offense, or a completed phase of an 
ongoing offense, before they can be laundered.  See Paramo, 998 
F.2d 1212 (the specified unlawful activity was legally completed 
mail fraud -- the proceeds of which were ripe for laundering.)13  
Here, gambling activity occurred at various business 
establishments where the video poker machines were located.  We 
find that the money, once collected from the poker machines, 
                     
13. Paramo, however, did not involve financial transactions 
with proceeds obtained from an ongoing offense, which is what is 
alleged here.  In Paramo, there was no dispute that the 
underlying offense and specified unlawful activity were legally 
completed prior to the financial transaction comprising the money 
laundering.  Thus, Paramo does not answer the question of when 
money becomes "proceeds" ripe for laundering, at issue here. 
 
 
became "proceeds of specified unlawful activity" within the 
meaning of the money laundering statute.  Accordingly, any 
subsequent financial transaction involving these proceeds that 
promotes or furthers the illegal gambling business could form the 
basis of a charge of money laundering.  
  The fact that there may be some overlap in the acts 
alleged to constitute the conduct of an illegal gambling business 
and money laundering does not give us pause.  We are mindful that 
Blockburger is only a test of statutory construction.  In 
conducting a double jeopardy analysis, the goal is to ascertain 
legislative intent and to apply the statute at issue, as written, 
in keeping with that intent.  Here, we find that the district 
court erred in failing to apply the money laundering statute as 
written. 
 As enacted by Congress, Title 18, United States Code, 
Section 1956(a)(1) prohibits financial transactions with the 
proceeds of specified unlawful activity.  Congress has determined 
that "specified unlawful activity" includes conducting an illegal 
gambling business under Title 18, United States Code, Section 
1955.  The term "specified unlawful activity" is expressly 
defined in § 1956(c)(7)(A) as, "any act or activity constituting 
an offense listed in section 1961(1) of this title . . . ."  
Title 18, United States Code, Section 1961(1)(B) identifies 
specified unlawful activity as "any act which is indictable under 
any of the following provisions of Title 18, United States Code . 
. . ."   Section 1955, the prohibition of illegal gambling 
business, is included in the list of offenses enumerated in Title 
 
 
18, United States Code, Section 1961(1)(B).  By including the 
conducting of an illegal gambling business in its list of 
specified unlawful activities on the same footing with numerous 
other offenses, Congress has indicated that no additional 
"specified unlawful activity" is required for the money 
laundering statute to apply when the specified unlawful activity 
is an illegal gambling business.14 
 Furthermore, the legislative history of the Money 
Laundering Crimes Act of 1986, of which section 1956 is a part, 
indicates that illegal gambling activity was an area of 
congressional concern.  The comments by Senator Strom Thurmond, 
one of the bill's sponsors, are illustrative: 
                     
14.   The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recently 
observed in United States v. LeBlanc, 24 F.3d 340 (1st Cir. 1994) 
that although the "classic" money laundering case is where a 
"drug trafficker collects large amounts of cash from drug sales 
and deposits the drug proceeds in a bank under the guise of 
conducting a legitimate business transaction," the Money 
Laundering Control Act "prohibits a much broader range of conduct 
than just the `classic' example of money laundering."  The Court 
of Appeals stated, "The language of the statute, in conjunction 
with the definitions provided in 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c) indicates 
that Congress intended to criminalize a broad array of 
transactions designed to facilitate numerous federal crimes, 
including illegal gambling."  24 F.3d at 346. 
 
 In Leblanc, the court of appeals held that the 
defendants' offenses (money laundering and operating an illegal 
gambling business) fell within the "heartland" of money 
laundering cases and reversed the district court's grant of a 
downward departure under the sentencing guidelines on the theory 
that the offenses were essentially the operation of an illegal 
gambling business.  See also United States v. Stavroulakis, 952 
F.2d 686, 691 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Congress has made clear that 
concealing the source of illegal gambling proceeds is just as 




 The President's Commission on organized crime 
has identified money laundering as one of the 
greatest challenges facing law enforcement 
today.  A recent Wall Street Journal article 
states that illegal doings, gambling and vice 
generate $150 billion dollars annually.  It 
is readily apparent that criminals rely on 
laundering schemes to hide the identities and 
true source of the proceeds. 
 
See Senate Report (S. Rep. 99-43), 99th Cong., 2d Session, pp.3-4 
(1986); Congressional Record (132 Cong. Rec. 17571, July 24, 
1986). 
  The district court, in holding that conducting an 
illegal gambling business cannot satisfy the specified unlawful 
activity requirement of the money laundering statute, has unduly 
narrowed the scope of the money laundering statute.  In so doing, 
the district court has interpreted this statute in a manner 
inconsistent with its express provisions and legislative intent.  
 Since Count One did not charge any specified unlawful 
activity other than conducting an illegal gambling business, the 
district court found that Count One failed to charge a conspiracy 
to commit money laundering.  Because we find that the conduct in 
this case, conducting an illegal gambling business, constitutes 
"specified unlawful activity" within the meaning of the money 
laundering statute, we conclude that Count One is sufficient to 
charge a conspiracy to commit money laundering.15  Accordingly, 
                     
15.   It is not our role at this juncture to comment on the 
sufficiency of the government's evidence to support a conviction 
for money laundering.  We observe only that the government may 
allege and prove conspiracy even if the underlying substantive 
object of the conspiracy is never completed.  For this reason, a 
conspiracy indictment need not allege every element of the 
underlying offense, but need only put defendants on notice that 
 
 
we will remand this case to the district court so that the money 




 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the judgment 
of the district court dismissing the money laundering object of 
the Count One of the indictment and remand to the district court 
for its reinstatement.   
(..continued) 
they are charged with a conspiracy to commit the underlying 
substantive offense.  United States v. Werme, 939 F.2d 108, 112 
(3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1165 (1992); United 
States v. Wander, 601 F.2d 1251, 1259 (3d Cir. 1979). 
